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1. Introduction
Seventy years after World War II (‘WWII’), crimes com-
mitted by Japanese forces during the War remain a rele-
vant political and legal issue, despite the evidence relied 
upon by the Trial Judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (‘the Judgment’) and the dis-
cussions in the process to establish diplomatic relations 
between China and Japan. It is generally perceived that 
Japan has not been as repentant for war crimes as Germa-
ny. Controversial readings of Japanese attitudes towards 
the crimes are available, such as that “the younger gener-
ation has little knowledge of the recent past”,1 or “opinion 
polls suggest that most Japanese feel their country did 
things in Asia for which the country should apologize”.2 
The Chinese public still cares about signs of Japanese re-
pentance. While Japanese prime ministers have repeat-
edly apologized for their country’s misdeeds, issues like 
the absence of nationally sponsored museums in Japan 
that acknowledge Japanese aggression continue to irritate 
Chinese observers. The Japanese prime ministers’ offer-
ings at the Yasukuni Shrine, which for the Chinese public 
symbolizes a lack of repentance, enhances an anti-Japan 
mood in China. The dispute over the Diaoyu or Senkaku 
Islands in 2012 again provoked many Chinese citizens 
and confirmed their dissatisfaction with the lack of Japa-
nese repentance, leading to demonstrations against Japan 
in several cities in China. The crimes committed by Jap-
anese forces in China during WWII remain a trauma that 
influences the political and diplomatic relations between 
the two countries. 
This brief asks whether the Far East Trial Judgment 
1 See ZHU Wenqi, “Prologue by ZHU Wenqi”, in Morten Bergsmo, 
CHEAH Wui Ling, SONG Tianying and YI Ping (editors), His-
torical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 4, Torkel 
Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Brussels, 2015, pp. xiii–xxii. 
2 See Kirk Spitzer, “Why Japan Is Still Not Sorry Enough”, 2012, 
available at http://nation.time.com/2012/12/11/why-japan-is-still-
not-sorry-enough/. The URLs referred to in this brief were last ac-
cessed on 1 May 2016.
can be helpful today in healing trauma by documenting 
and thus making visible crimes committed by Japanese 
forces. The political significance of this trauma in both 
domestic governance and foreign relations falls outside 
the scope of this brief.3 Rather, the brief compares legal 
facts recognized in the Judgment – judicial findings – and 
the general perception of the Chinese public about the 
crimes. If the general perception in China and the legal 
facts contained in the Judgment largely overlap, the Ju-
dgment could make an important contribution to a pro-
cess of healing. In answering the question, issues arise 
concerning individual responsibility for crimes and the 
significance of war crimes trials. After the comparison of 
legal facts and public perception in section 2 below, the 
brief will reflect on such issues in section 3, and conclu-
de by stressing the potential positive role of the Far East 
Tribunal and its Judgment for trauma healing in China. 
2. Comparing Legal Facts in the Judgment and Pub-
lic Perception
2.1. Legal Facts
2.2.1. A Historical Line of Invasion
The historical line of invasion is represented in the Judg-
ment in a meticulous and unambiguous way.4 This cap-
tures a broad spectrum of victimization of Chinese people 
in the affected areas. Details of the invasion were includ-
ed in the Judgment, including the following facts: The 
attack at Mukden on 18 September 1931 (p. 91), the mur-
der of marshal CHANG Tso-lin (pp. 527-529), the uni-
lateral establishment of “Manchukuo” by the Japanese 
Army (p. 569), the invasion of Shanghai starting from 
3 For discussions on the political factors contributing to post-WW 
II relations in Asia, see Thomas U. Berger, War, Guilt, and World 
Politics after World War II, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
4 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
p. 521. Another summary is provided on pp. 1139–1140. The entire 
Judgment and trial transcripts are freely available in the ICC Legal 
Tools Database. 
2 • www.toaep.org
28 January 1932 (p. 596), the invasion of Jehol Province 
in 1932 and the subsequent occupation of Jehol (p. 648), 
the Hopei Incident and North Chahar Incident in May 
and June 1935, the establishment of an “independent” 
Mongolian government in 1936 (p. 672), the Fentai In-
cident in September 1936, the Lukouchiao incident (pp. 
682-685), the clash at Langfang (p. 691), the onslaught 
at Nanyuan (p. 692), the capture of Peiping on 8 August 
1937 (p. 693), the attack of Shanghai in August 1937 and 
planned offensives in Central China (p. 267), the setting 
up of a Shanghai Ta-Tao City Government in December 
1937 (p. 699), the capture of Taiyuan on 9 November 
1937 (p. 702), attack on and crimes committed in Nan-
king which came to be known as the “Rape of Nanking” 
(pp. 707-708), the establishment of the provisional “Chi-
nese Government” on 14 December 1937 as the govern-
ment in North China (pp. 714-717), the process of es-
tablishing the Renovation Government in Central China 
(pp. 717-721), military advances in many Chinese towns 
and villages (p. 268), invasion of several cities (Hsuch-
ow (19 May 1938), Kaifeng (6 June 1938), Matang (27 
June 1938), Kiukiang (25 July 1938), Sinyang (12 Octo-
ber 1938), Hankow (25 October 1938) (p. 722), Canton 
(20 October 1938) (p. 731), Hainan Island (10 February 
1939) (p. 732), Nanchang (26 March 1939) (p. 742), the 
invasion of Lungchow (23 December 1939) and the cap-
ture of Nanning (p. 746), the capture of Ichang (12 June 
1940) and Kaifeng (30 June 1940), sending troops to In-
do-China (p. 750), armed operations against Chungking 
and bombing of Kunming and Chungking (pp. 754-755), 
the capture of Lungling and Tengchung in Yunnan Prov-
ince in May 1942, the capture of Changthe in Hunnan 
Province in December 1943, the intensification of mili-
tary operations in the interior of central China by the mid-
dle of 1944, the capture of Chengchow (20 April 1944), 
Loyang (25 May 1944), Changsha (18 June 1944), Heng-
yang (8 August 1944), Kweilin (10 November 1944), and 
Liuchow (11 November 1944) (pp. 759-760).  
2.1.2. Japan’s Military Strategy and Intentions
The commanding organization in Japan during WWII 
was the Imperial General Headquarters. Set up on 20 
November 1937 by the Cabinet, it included “the Emper-
or, who was its head”. The Judgment recognizes that the 
Imperial General Headquarters “had a great deal of influ-
ence on the Japanese Government prior to the outbreak of 
the Pacific War” (p. 706).
The Judgment includes several documents revealing 
the policies of Japan. The “Amau Statement” issued on 
17 April 1934 by the Japanese Foreign Office was recog-
nized as the “official declaration by the Foreign Ministry 
of Japan’s policy toward China” (p. 628). Other official 
documents of the Japanese Army include the Konoye 
Declaration of 16 January 1936 which set the stage “for 
further invasion and the development of local regimes ul-
timately for the creation of a ‘new government’ in China” 
(p. 713); the Japanese “Five Ministers’ Conference” in 
1938 which planned “the establishment of a Japanese-do-
minated or ‘puppet’ government for the whole of China 
as distinct from the local governments already establi-
shed” (pp. 724-728). “Konoye’s Three Principles” aimed 
at creating in China “a complacent Government […] by 
Japan, giving the latter complete control of China” (p. 
741). These policies were clearly connected with acts of 
aggression against China based on military strategy. The 
Judgment recognizes that several key statements like tho-
se above were issued by the Japanese Foreign Office.
Furthermore, the Judgment establishes beyond doubt 
that conflicts were provoked on purpose by the Japanese 
Army. For example, the so-called Lukouchiao Incident 
was described by the Tribunal as “the culmination of the 
Army’s scheme for bringing north China under Japanese 
rule” (p. 183). 
2.1.3. Crimes Indicted
It is clearly stated in the Judgment that “the case made 
against the accused is of waging aggressive war, with the 
object, inter alia, of obtaining economic domination of 
Manchuria and other parts of China” (p. 761). For the 
intention of waging war, the Tribunal found that “the con-
spiracy to wage wars of aggression was already criminal 
in the highest degree” (p. 1142).
Annex 6 provides the Indictment, charging the mili-
tary officials with the crime against peace, conventional 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Appendix A of 
Annex 6 provides the summarized particulars showing 
the principal matters and events; Appendix B provides 
the list of articles of treaties violated by Japan; Appendix 
C provides the list of official assurances violated by Ja-
pan; and Appendix D provides the conventions and assu-
rances that, together with the practice of civilized nations, 
established laws and customs of war.
Annex 6 and the appendices provide summarized lists 
of crimes, as well as specific bases on which international 
law was violated. Some detailed descriptions were provi-
ded in the Judgment.5
5 P. 1001 of the Judgment provides a general description of the “cru-
elties of the most inhumane and barbarous character practiced by 
the Japanese Army and Navy”; p. 1002 says that the killing of pris-
oners, death marches, forced labor, torture and cannibalism were 
practiced; pp. 1008–1009 state that the practice of machine-gun-
ning of civilians “continued throughout the China War; the worst 
example of its being the massacre of the inhabitants of Nanking in 
December 1937”; p. 1010 describes torture of captured Chinese; 
pp. 1011–1015: details of the rape of Nanking; pp. 1019–1022: the 
expansion of war and crimes committed by the Japanese Army; pp. 
1030–1031: some atrocities committed by the Japanese Army; pp. 
1037, 1038 and 1044–1057: crimes, including death marches and 
massacres of prisoners of war, committed in the Pacific War; pp. 
1057–1064: a brief summary of torture and other inhumane treat-
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2.1.4.	Specific	Terms	Illustrated	in	the	Judgment
The Judgment deals in particular with several terms used 
by the Japanese Army. It shows that these terms were de-
liberately used wrongly or without the meaning the terms 
are normally acknowledged to contain.
The first term is “national defense” which was recog-
nized by the Tribunal as Japan’s argument to justify her 
own aggressive policies (p. 669). The second is “inci-
dent” described as follows by the Judgment: “Japanese 
Governments refused to acknowledge that the hostilities 
in China constituted a war. They persistently called it an 
‘Incident’” (p. 1003). 
2.2. Public Perceptions
To compare the legal facts of the Judgment as briefly de-
scribed above with public perceptions in China on crimes 
committed by Japanese forces during WWII, let us brief-
ly examine the crimes contained in the following Chi-
nese media: curriculum textbooks, slogans in anti-Japan 
demonstrations, information available on web sites to 
memorize WWII, and claims made in law suits for com-
pensation.
First, in the Chinese National History Curriculum for 
Senior High School published by the People’s Educa-
tion Press in 2007,6 a number of events were listed with 
emphasis on the brutal behaviour of the Japanese Army, 
including the Machine-Gun Killings in Nanking and Pan-
jiayu, the use of a biological unit in north-east China, the 
activities of Unit 731, the deployment of a chemical we-
apons unit in north-east China, and Unit 516 which was 
involved in raping and killing civilians.
Second, slogans used in anti-Japan demonstrations 
express public perceptions about the crimes. The de-
monstrations in 2012 included the slogans “Defend the 
Diaoyu Islands”, “Smash Japanese Imperialism”, and 
“Resist Japanese Products”. Another anti-Japanese de-
monstration happened in 2005. The slogan largely used 
was “Patriotism is Not a Sin”. The slogan “Face History” 
was also used in the demonstration.
Third, information on Chinese web sites shows per-
ceptions of crimes committed by Japanese forces during 
WWII. For example, on the web site china1931.cn details 
of events in WWII are provided under the categories of 
biological warfare, “comfort women”, and forced labour 
respectively. Oral statements or memoirs of those invol-
ment committed by the Japanese Army in China and throughout 
the Pacific War; and pp. 1067, 1083, 1089 and 1091: certain prac-
tices of the Japanese Army including vivisection, forced labour, 
excessive punishment, mass punishment, and death penalty.
6 See Secondary School Curriculum Research and Development 
Center (中学课程研究开发中心), People’s Education Press 
Version of Normal Senior Secondary School Curriculum Standard 
Experimental Textbook on History (人教版普通高中课程标准实
验教科书历史课本), People’s Education Press (人民教育出版
社), Beijing, 2007.
ved in war at the time and pictures taken as well as diaries 
of Japanese war criminals are the main sources for the 
events presented. Under the category of biological war-
fare, for example, there are 107 articles or news items 
providing information relating to what happened during 
WWII as regards biological warfare. The articles inclu-
de general claims on the use of biological weapons, on 
which Japanese forces were involved (Units 526, 731 and 
1644), and on specific events that occurred in the war that 
involved the use of biological weapons, together with 
evidence (including copies of newspaper articles at the 
time in both China and Japan, memoirs from victims who 
survived the war, records in archives, books published in 
China, the United States, and Japan). According to the 
evidence on the web site, places where biological wea-
pons were used include Beitong, Chongshan, Luxi, Yiwu, 
Changde, Ningbo, Guangfeng, Shangrao, Nanking, and 
areas in the provinces of Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Yunnan and 
Canton. 
Fourth, the compensation claims in Japanese law-
suits brought by Chinese victims for crimes committed 
by Japanese forces reflect some of the perceptions on the 
crimes. Such lawsuits started from 1995 onwards. Suits 
against private companies have been mainly about the 
issue of forced labour. Several cases ended with finan-
cial compensation for Chinese victims.7 As far as lawsuits 
about the issues of “comfort women” and biological war-
fare are concerned, state responsibility and corresponding 
compensation are still being debated.8
2.3. Comparing Public Perceptions and the Judg-
ment
When comparing public perceptions on crimes commit-
ted by Japanese forces during WWII with the legal facts 
on the crimes established by the Judgment, we notice that 
some events that are greatly emphasized in China today 
did not draw much attention in the Judgment, and that 
differences appear in details of crimes. For example, 
much public attention has been paid in China to the ac-
tivities of the Japanese Units 731 and 1644 which were 
the units committing biological warfare in China, while 
in the Judgment biological warfare is given only limited 
attention without much detail being provided. Likewise, 
the practice of vivisection included in the Judgment does 
not contain information about Unit 731 which has drawn 
much attention in China. Another example of the differ-
7 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, Volume 3: 
International Enforcement, Third Edition, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008, 
pp. 649–650.
8 See William Underwood and KANG Jian, “Japan’s Top Court 
Poised to Kill Lawsuits by Chinese War Victims”, available at 
http://japanfocus.org/-Kang-Jian/2369/article.html; Sayuri Um-
eda, “Japan: WWII POW and Forced Labor Compensation Cas-
es”, available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/pow-compensation/
japan.php. 
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ence between publicly perceived crimes and crimes rec-
ognized by the judgment are the crimes committed in the 
Pacific War by Japanese forces outside China. Further-
more, while not much attention was paid by the Chinese 
public to economic domination, the Judgment recognized 
the economic domination by Japanese forces during the 
war in China. 
Although these differences exist, a detailed compari-
son leads to the conclusion that the Judgment provides 
not only evidence for various public claims made, but 
also a wider range of crimes than what we see in the pu-
blic discourse in China. The documentation drawn upon 
by the Judgment is a foundation for open debate on the 
construction of the Far East Tribunal, on the evidence 
collected for the proceedings before the Tribunal, on the 
facts recognized in the Judgment, and, most importantly, 
on relevant legal and political issues based on the facts 
recognized. For these reasons, the Judgment could very 
well serve as an instrument of healing by documenting 
the crimes committed by Japanese forces in China in 
WWII. 
3.	 Conclusion:	Between	‘Truth’	and	Interpretation	
The extent of horror in the crimes referred to above leads 
to the equation of international law and civilization, pur-
suant to a progressive historiography in which horror is 
conquered for the “survival of humanity”. 9 The civiliza-
tion premise perceives law as developing. Thus, although 
the international law on aggression and criminal respon-
sibility was not yet developed at the outset of WWII, it 
shall be applied, so the argument goes. The reasoning 
starts with the premise that the facts were clear, that “all 
the judges agreed upon these facts”, while the “law [...] 
was doubtful”.10 While acknowledging the horror of the 
crimes, this argument should not neglect the context in 
which the crimes happened. Interpretation of what hap-
pened through the legal arrangement or classification of 
‘crimes against humanity’ constructs what had happened, 
and erases horror during the period of war.11
While trials seek to deal with the “truth”, the “truth” 
is about interpretation. In international criminal justice, 
9 ZHU Wenqi, supra note 1, p. xviii.
10 Ibid., p. xvii. 
11 Martti Koskenniemi, “Between Impunity and Show Trials”, in 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 2002, vol. 6, pp. 
1–35.
the way the trial is constructed is the beginning of inter-
pretation: the legal arrangements or classifications in the 
trial will have an impact on the “truth”. The events are 
interpreted through the lens of the legal arrangements and 
structuring of the trial. History and memory, meanwhile, 
are closely linked with future-oriented political interests. 
Add the fragmented evidence caused by the particulari-
ties of war, and we can picture the limits of the trial, as 
Koskenniemi writes: “The engagement of a court with 
‘truth’ and ‘memory’ is thus always an engagement with 
political antagonism, and nowhere more so than in dea-
ling with events of wide-ranging international and moral 
significance […] Much is at stake for the protagonists – 
that is the nature of the trial – and no truth can remain 
sacred within it”.12 
In the course of an international criminal trial, open 
argumentation takes place, involving conflicts of inter-
pretation. This brief submits that a key value of the trial 
lies exactly in this conflict. The post-WWII trauma in 
China has lasted to this day, despite the work of the Far 
East Tribunal. Controversial arguments have been made 
about the legitimacy of the Tribunal, in particular that it 
represented victors’ justice.13 More conflicts between in-
terpretations at the Tribunal could have prevented this. 
As mentioned above, the Far East Judgment could 
well serve as an instrument to heal the trauma in China. 
It addresses a broad spectrum of victimization of Chinese 
by Japanese forces in connection with WWII. Further re-
search on possible conflicts of interpretation in the work 
of the Tribunal could contribute towards the good purpo-
se of healing. 
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